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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE IN
MALPRACTICE CASES: THE PERFORMANCE
RECORDS OF PRACTITIONERS
Paul D. Rheingold*
INTRODUCTION
The availability of statistical information about the mortal-
ity and morbidity rates associated with specific treatments by
individual practitioners and hospitals raises the question of the
use of these data in medical malpractice litigation. The purpose
of this Commentary is to explore the precedents and arguments
for and against the use of such data.
Any analysis of the problem of admissibility of performance
data must at the threshold ascertain the cause of action in-
volved. Generally there are two causes of action in suits against
physicians: the action for negligence or malpractice and the ac-
tion for lack of informed consent.1 As will be demonstrated, the
potential legal usefulness of the statistical data on performance
differs as greatly as the nature of these two causes of action. In
the negligence suit the data are offered as evidence; in the in-
formed consent action, they are offered as information.
A further important distinction may be made between the
potential use of performance data in an action against an indi-
vidual practitioner and against a hospital. The hospital is con-
sidered separately in the third section of this Commentary be-
cause of special issues relating to its responsibility as an
operator of an institution and as one that extends privileges to
independent practitioners to use its facilities.
* Trial attorney, Rheingold & McGowan, P.C., New York City. Former Instructor,
Harvard Law School. Author of various papers and books on product liability and mal-
practice. Overseer, Institute of Civil Justice, Rand Institute; Member, Carnegie Commis-
sion on Science and Technology.
1 See 1 DAvin W. LOuISELL & HAROLD WILLAS, MEDICAL 16ALPRACrzCE 8.04-.06
(1969).
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I. THE MALPRACTICE CAUSE OF ACTION
A. Potential Admissibility of Proof
Were performance data available and admissible, it is quite
predictable how counsel would utilize such data in court. If the
defendant physician had a rate of deaths in open heart surgery,
for example, that exceeded by several times the average for like
practitioners (after adjustment was made, of course), plaintiff
would assert that fact as at least some evidence on the issue of
whether the defendant used due care during the operation or
treatment at issue. Likewise, if the defendant were shown to be
statistically far superior to other physicians, his own counsel
would produce this as proof of some evidence of due care at the
time of the disputed treatment.
Even if performance data were admissible, it is not likely
that the side favored by them would argue that they were con-
clusive on the central issue, as compared to the "some-weight"
approach for which most evidence is admitted in medical mal-
practice and other negligence cases-that is, for whatever weight
the jury may attach to it. It is most unlikely that the mere fact
that the doctor was superior statistically would be a total de-
fense, or that the plaintiff could make out a prima facie case on
the mere showing that the doctor was a substantial laggard
overall.
It is predictable, however, that courts, at least in the initial
years of hearing testimony on performance data, will not allow
the evidence. This position is based upon: consideration of the
few analogous legal areas that exist; generally confused and neg-
ative judicial attitudes toward statistics; the unreliable and in-
conclusive nature of the data that are so far available; and the
ease with which their reliability can be attacked.
If one wants to pigeonhole evidence on performance into an
existing rule of evidence justifying its admissibility, one might
look first at the law of similarity evidence. This has been some-
what codified under Federal Rules of Evidence 401.2 While the
rule seems extraordinarily permissive on what is similar since it
2 Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EvID. 401. See
also JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., EVIDENCE 401[08] (1992).
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speaks in terms of "any tendency" to make something more or
less probable, it is predictable that most courts would find that
what a doctor did in general during a period of time has little
meaning for what he did on a specific occasion.
If one did want to argue for admissibility under the similar-
ity rule, there are recent cases in other legal areas where statisti-
cal evidence was used to prove a specific fact, such as in employ-
ment discrimination cases, or in the use of profiles in stopping
persons.s There are, however, a great number of judicial deci-
sions and much review literature that show a distrust of the use
of statistics as a means of proving a specific fact in personal in-
jury cases and especially toxic tort litigation.4
In the actual litigation of malpractice cases, one rarely sees
admitted "similarity" evidence such as that the doctor injured
another patient, had been sued before or since for malpractice,
or had lost privileges or a license. At the same time, one can
hardly say what the law is in an area where lawyers have not
tried to advance it by offering new types of proof." Nor would
defense attorneys generally think that they could properly ask
their client if he or she had many successful surgeries, or had
ever been sued before for malpractice.
The closer one gets to the actual situation involved in the
trial, however, such as whether the doctor had made the very
same mistake before, or what the doctor's failure rate was for
the same exact surgery, the more likely proof of other occur-
rences would be admissible under the similarity doctrine. Under
3 Id. at 401110] et seq.
I RICHARD A. WEHMHOEFER, STATISTICS iN LITIGATION: PRACTICAL APPLICATION FOR
LAwYERs (1985); Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiological Proof in Toxic Tort
Litigation, 52 FoRaHtm L REv. 732 (1984); Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Sta-
tistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation,
73 Co NEL ,. REv. 469 (1988).
1 Cases presenting situations perhaps analogous to the topic of this article include
Evans v. Dugger, 908 F.2d 801 (11th Cir. 1990) (attempt, in an action for bad care of one
prisoner, to introduce statistical studies about 17 years of bad care generally to patients
in the system); Johnson v. Meyers, 165 S.E.2d 739 (Ga. 1968) (Plaintiff-patient could not
introduce evidence that defendant-doctor had previously performed unnecessary surgery
as proof that defendant-doctor had performed similarly unnecessary surgery on plain-
tiff.); Boddy v. Parker, 45 A.D.2d 1000, 358 N.Y.S.2d 218 (2d Dept. 1974) (where plaintiff
in malpractice action sought records from defendant's doctor and hospital relating to all
other hysterectomies doctor had done within past two years, presumably as to informa-
tion bearing on her own injury during a hysterectomy, disclosure was denied on a privi-
lege basis).
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this approach, and even if one favored some admissibility of
data, it would be easy to state that what the general experience
of a doctor was over a year with one type of surgery is not simi-
lar enough. That would leave open the possibility that someday
there could be data so tailored to the facts of the case, control-
ling for all its many variables, that such data would be
admissible.
In counterbalance with the liberal rules of admissibility, as
reflected in Rule 401, provisions in the law of evidence deny ad-
mission on the basis of prejudice. Rule 403 in the federal system
expresses this concept: probative value can be found to be out-
weighed by "unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading the jury. ' '6 It is here, certainly, that many judges would
look for the source of power to reject performance data since
they would fear that the jury would give too much weight to the
data. Hearing the statistics that in general showed the doctor to
be a far outlier (statistically at an extreme) good or bad doctor,
jurors might decide solely on that issue, especially if they had
difficulty resolving the issue presented to them. There is at least
an analogy to the exclusion of evidence of other crimes in a
criminal case.1
B. Attack on Reliability
We have so far just considered the admissibility vel non of
performance data. Even if the use of the data were permitted,
the attorney offering the proof would have to make sure that the
proof is in admissible form-a special problem when statistics
are involved. Of course, satisfying the requirements of the hear-
say and authentication rules would not be complicated, but it
could be time consuming and expensive, since witnesses might
be called to obtain and interpret the evidence.
Of much greater importance to the subject of this Commen-
tary would be to inquire how one might attack the reliability of
the data as to a physician or institution. This attack might come
at two stages of a trial. The more likely is as a threshold matter
where the opponent makes known the objection to the proposed
I FED. R EVID. 403.
7 Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) states: "[elvidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in con-
formity therewith." FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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evidence and demonstrates to the judge, either on papers or by
witnesses, the unreliability of the proof. Or, if the data are al-
lowed into evidence for whatever weight the jury wants to give
them, the same type of attack could take place upon cross-exam-
ination of a witness in an effort to nullify the impact of the
statistics.
The attack upon the reliability of performance statistics
would proceed along traditional lines of attack for any statistical
evidence offered.' In brief outline, the attorney would attack:
1) errors in the collection of the data and math errors in the
data's manipulation, unrelated to whatever theories are
involved;
2) bias errors-failure to consider factors that may confound the
numbers, e.g., the failure to consider that the patients of the
doctor in question in some way differed materially from those of
other doctors in the study;
3) demonstration of internal contradictions, such as a great year-
to-year variability of performance (and what year would one use
for comparison purposes anyway?); and
4) lack of significant differences-to what degree would we de-
mand that chance be eliminated or how many standard devia-
tions would be required?
Aside from attacking statistics on their own level, one could
also anticipate a broad attack on more emotional bases. The
doctor-defendant will argue that the patient-plaintiff differed
from her other patients in the database, or that her practice dif-
fers in ways not studied, such as the fact that she was willing to
take on harder cases. Even if these were factors considered in
the statistical workup, still one would have to prove this.
It seems likely that a judge who saw such a great battle
shaping up on the meaning of statistics-a subject with which
most judges are uncomfortable-would find one or another justi-
fication for rejecting what, at best, is only marginal evidence of
fault or lack of it. In this respect such statistical evidence would
not even be on a par with evidence that a doctor has lost his
license or privileges; these would be facts that could be demon-
strated without knowing the higher math involved in
epidemiology.
s See supra note 4.
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II. INFORMED CONSENT
A. Nature of the Doctor's Duty
When we turn to the use of performance data in actions for
lack of informed consent, we radically change perspectives: there
is now much less of a question of the weight or accuracy of the
data or prejudice in their use, and much more a question of the
proximate consequences of a doctor failing to meet the law's re-
quirements. Because of these differences, it is predictable that as
performance data become more available and accurate, there
will be a requirement that the practitioner inform the patient of
his track record.
While there are probably as many different states as there
are variations of the exact duty of a physician to give informa-
tion to a patient about the risks and benefits of a proposed
treatment, the alternatives to treatment, and under what cir-
cumstances, there is at least a general consensus that some at-
tempt be made to tell the patient what are the possible good and
bad consequences of a proposed surgery.,
An argument might conceivably be made that a doctor can
satisfy the duty by disclosing the specific risks known to occur in
the hands of any and all practitioners. It does seem inescapable,
however, that part of the information about risks would be what
the doctor's own experience has been, even if all risks are
lumped together. Indeed, it has always been known that risks
vary with each practitioner, based upon studies of adverse con-
sequences of surgeons at various institutions.
The doctor could not fully escape, I believe, from volunteer-
ing this information for reasons of doubt about the reliability of
the statistics, at least not without describing them and then ex-
plaining their limits. Nor, as in the malpractice action, could the
doctor argue that any prejudice outweighs the benefits of the ev-
idence. It is, after all, not evidence we are dealing with in this
cause of action, but the duty to obtain a consent to treat or oth-
erwise invade the human body, a concept partially rooted in the
theory of autonomy and dignity.10 As a related point, the doctor
I See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law
of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. RE V. 607. See also supra
note 1.
10 See Twerski & Cohen, supra note 9, at 610. "Courts deem the unwanted and
[Vol. 58: 75
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would also be under a duty to respond if the patient asked her
what her record was with the particular type of surgery. To deny
that she had such data would be as much a violation of her duty
as not to volunteer the data, if not more so.
One relevant aspect of the outcome studies done to date
would be particularly important, I believe, for the doctor to
share with the patient contemplating using this doctor's services:
in general the more often a doctor performs a relatively complex
treatment, e.g., open heart surgery, the more likely a successful
outcome ("practice makes perfect"). Therefore, the doctor who
rarely does a particular surgery or is still on the rising part of
the learning curve would have to disclose this information to the
patient.
How exactly the doctor presents the required information as
to his "batting statistics" is no more precise than how in general
he is to satisfy the informed consent requirement. Generally
courts have not laid down precise rules simply because it is a
very subjective, give-and-take conversation, done in the office of
the doctor. Rather, courts look at the end product: would a rea-
sonable patient, having been told, have consented to the treat-
ment? The doctor would be free to explain the bad statis-
tics-and would probably tend to try to explain them away. If
he over-trivialized the data, e.g., assuring the patient that they
are meaningless because he takes on sick patients, he might, of
course, be found not to have attained the requisite informed
consent.
Just as I considered in Section A the use each side might
make of performance data when they were above or below par,
we should consider what use might be made, properly or im-
properly, by a physician in the consent setting of the fact that
the doctor had much better than average experience. Could she
say there is generally a risk of such and so happening but it has
not happened to her or that she has the safest rating in New
York State? The answer to this would not be so much in terms
of whether she has somehow vitiated the consent she otherwise
unconsented touching by the physician sufficiently egregious that they have assimilated
the conduct of even a well-intentioned doctor to the more violent and antisocial acts of
those wrongdoers more usually associated with intentional torts." Id. An early but still
leading case in New York is Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125,
105 N.E. 92 (1914).
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obtained (she did after all tell the truth), but whether she used
some form of unprofessional puffing to sell the patient on the
surgery. The fact that she did not have in her series a particular
complication often seen nationally does not really mean that she
can promise the patient 'that it will not happen this time. An
unknowledgeable person, however, could take the information
that way.
B. Proximate Cause Issues
Under most versions of the informed consent doctrine, the
doctor does not pay damages merely because he did not warn a
patient about risk. Further links are required: that, as a result of
the failure to inform of risks, the patient (a) consented and (b)
was injured." Just as it is very difficult in practice for a former
patient to convince a jury that, had she been properly informed,
she would not have had the surgery and, therefore, would not
have been injured, predictably it will be very difficult to prove
that had the doctor only added that his performance was two
standard deviations away from a supposed norm, the patient
would not have had some specific consequence of the surgery be-
fall her.
There probably would not be much jury appeal in an argu-
ment made by a patient's counsel that his client would have con-
sented to the surgery knowing the general risks and known side
effects, e.g., a post-operative infection, but would have withheld
her consent if she had known, in addition, that there were
greater than usual risks associated with the treatment in the
hands of the particular doctor. After all, even in the best of
hands, the post-operative infection still had a chance of
occurring. 12
There are other problems with an informed consent cause of
action. Plaintiffs' attorneys generally believe that juries will not
make awards, even if there was a failure to inform, chiefly be-
cause juries themselves decide that the treatment was needed.
" The New York version of this rule has been codified. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §
2805-d (McKinney Supp. 1986). See also Twerski & Cohen, supra note 9, at 609.
12 It should be noted that considerations as to proximate cause do not arise under
the negligence cause of action considered in Part I. Evidence as to departure from the
standard of care is required. Once a departure is shown, the next inquiry is whether the
departure was, overall, a cause of the injury.
[Vol. 58:75
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This does not, however, negate making a valuable side use of a
cause of action for informed consent teamed with the routine
negligence suit: if the doctor wants to claim that the injury
caused was "just one of those things," and in no way an indica-
tion of fault, then one can ask why the patient was not warned
about the chance of its happening before the treatment.
A second problem is how damages might be measured. Is
the doctor to pay for all of the bad, but no-fault ill consequences
that happened because she didn't disclose her negative statis-
tics? And if she lied about her statistics, might the cause of ac-
tion really be one for misrepresentation and limited damages be
awarded under that theory of tort?13
III. THE HosPITAL SETTING
A hospital, as compared to an individual practitioner, might
be under a duty to disclose statistics relating to its institution or
practitioners on its staff on the basis of arguments already re-
viewed relating to similarity or arising out of its special relation
to health care delivery. For example, if the hospital were provid-
ing clinic care, with no particular doctor involved, i.e., the per-
son is the patient of the hospital, then the issues discussed as to
negligence and informed consent would apply.
The most obvious special duty of an institution arises out of
the responsibility hospitals have in giving permission to physi-
cians to practice there. The hospital must use due care in issuing
credentials, reviewing them and examining new information that
may come to the hospital's attention. In legal terms, failure to
meet this standard may constitute negligent hiring and negligent
retention."4 Specifically with regard to its duty to admitted pa-
tients, would the hospital be liable for keeping on its staff a doc-
tor who is a major outlier from the statistical norm? Case law
does not provide an exact answer, but certainly the patient
would have a valid argument. If a hospital is liable for keeping
on a bad apple, of what weight is it against the hospital that in
general the doctor has worse than average outcomes, and against
13 See W. PAGE KEETON LT AL., PROSSER AND KENON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at
725 (5th ed. 1984). The tort of misrepresentation in this context occurs when the physi-
cian induces a patient's consent by misrepresenting her statistical profile.
14 On negligent hiring, retention and supervision, see 1 JD. Lan & BARRY A. Ln4-
DAHL, MODERN TORT LAW § 7.03 (Rev. ed. 1988).
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what background is this to be examined-the other doctors at
the hospital (it may be an especially bad or good hospital) or all
doctors?
Even less resolved would be the issue of the duty of the hos-
pital to warn patients about its own statistics. Let us assume the
hospital was the worst of many studied in a state as far as
deaths associated with the performance of bypass surgery:
should it have a banner so proclaiming outside its admission of-
fice or, more reasonably, a notice that the results of a certain
study are available for examination? Who is to explain the data?
The hospital will argue that the surgeons it allows to practice
there should be the ones who explain their track record. Predict-
ably, courts would not move fast to require hospitals to make
any disclosure in this area, and may never do so.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there are many important policy reasons for
disclosing outcome statistics and helping the public understand
these statistics. It probably will improve the quality of care and
may rid us of bad apples, if such exist. However, these and other
valuable goals will not necessarily be furthered and may even be
frustrated if the proof of the information is allowed into court as
some evidence of whether a doctor is good or bad. However, con-
sistent with a doctor's duty to disclose what he or she knows
about risks attendant to a treatment, such information should
be disclosed. 15
16 Part of the concern of any attorney who writes about this evidence is whether
some day similar statistics might be gathered on the trial record of lawyers. Attorney A
wins 60% of his trials; Attorney B 40%. Would I have to disclose this to prospective
clients? There is, statistically, a 50-50% chance to win or lose every case.
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